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THE FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION:
REDEFINING THE EXCEPTION FOR AMOUNTS
PAID BY THE UNITED STATES UNDER
I.R.C. § 911
The United States, unlike most other major industrialized nations,
taxes on the basis of citizenship.' American citizens are taxed on their
worldwide income, regardless of where they reside.2 Citizens who pay
income tax to a foreign country may elect to deduct those taxes from
income,3 or to claim foreign taxes paid as a credit against United States
income tax.4 In addition, section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code al-
lows a qualified individual to exclude foreign earned income from gross
income.5 Certain amounts paid by the United States, however, are ex-
cepted from the exclusion.
6
The foreign earned income exclusion and the exception for
amounts paid by the United States have been part of the Code for over
fifty years.7 Despite this long history, section 911 frequently has been
the subject of scholarly criticism8 and congressional reform.9 Although
this controversy has centered primarily on how best to implement the
1 See, e.g., P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION 79 (1981); P. POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL
TAXATION 3-4 (1982); Maiers, The Foregn Earned Income Exclusion: Reinventing the Wheel, 34
TAX LAW. 691, 692 (1981).
2 I.R.C. § 61 (1976).
3 Id § 164(a).
4 Id § 901(a) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
5 Id § 91 1(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) ("At the election of a qualified individual . . .there
shall be excluded from the gross income of such individual, and exempt from taxation under
this subtitle, for any taxable year ... the foreign earned income of such individual.").
6 Id § 911 (b) (1)(B) (ii) ("The foreign earned income for an individual shall not include
amounts ... paid by the United States or an agency thereof to an employee of the United
States or an agency thereof.').
7 The foreign earned income exclusion was first passed in 1926. Revenue Act of 1926,
ch. 27, § 213(b)(14), 44 Stat. 9, 26. The exception for amounts paid by the United States was
added in 1932. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 116(a), 47 Stat. 169, 204.
8 See, e.g., Maiers, supra note 1; Patton, United States Individual Income Tax Policy as it
Applies to Americans Resident Overseas, 1975 DUKE L.J. 691; Postlewaite & Stem, Innocents
Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for its Repeal, 65 VA. L. REv. 1093
(1979); Note, A Proposal for the Elimination of Section 911, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 139
(1979); Note, The Taxation of Americans Living Abroad. The Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978 and
§§ 911 and913 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Taxation of Americans Living Abroad]; Note, Section 911 Tax Reform, 54 MINN. L.
REV. 823 (1970).
9 For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the foreign earned income exclu-
sion, see Hooton, The Disappearing Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, 55 TAXES 522 (1977); Le-
vine, Section 911: The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion-Death Blow or Recovery?, 56 TAXES 169
(1978); Slowinski & Williams, The Formative Years of the Foreign Source Earned Income Exclusion.
Section 911, 51 TAXES 355 (1973).
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goals of section 911, part of the difficulty can be traced to disagreement
as to what those goals are.10 The legislative history indicates that the
foreign earned income exclusion, at least initially, was intended to foster
foreign trade by providing an incentive for American workers to go
abroad, and by placing them in an equal position with citizens of other
nations going abroad who are not taxed by their native countries."
While Congress and commentators have wrestled with the efficacy
and function of section 911, the courts have had great difficulty in deter-
mining when an amount has been paid by the United States or its
agency and is thus fully includable in gross income. The case law re-
flects two distinct approaches. Some courts attempt to identify the
source of the funds from which the taxpayer has been paid ("source ap'-
proach"). Other courts place primary reliance on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship and attempt to identify the entity that
has the ultimate legal obligation to pay the taxpayer ("obligation
approach").
Both approaches have produced arbitrary and unprincipled results.
They are formalistic and turn on distinctions that are not based on con-
siderations of tax policy. Neither the determination of the ultimate
source of the funds from which the taxpayer is paid, nor the determina-
tion of which body is ultimately responsible for that payment, ade-
quately addresses the congressional concerns that the exclusion
embodies.
This Note examines the legislative history of both the foreign
earned income exclusion and the exception for amounts paid by the
United States or its agency. According to this analysis, the exclusion
reflects Congress's intent to provide an incentive for workers to go
abroad, and the exception reflects Congress's desire to deny this benefit
to certain American workers for whom no incentive to go abroad is nec-
essary. The Note suggests that in determining whether a taxpayer is
entitled to the benefits of section 911, a court should consider the type of
work the taxpayer does, and whether he is within the class of individuals
10 IThe rationale behind giving Americans overseas tax advantages has never
been unanimously agreed upon. Probably the most influential reasons for
giving tax advantages are that they are required to spur United States trade
overseas; to provide equitable treatment for Americans facing escalating costs
abroad; and to combat a perceived balance-of-payments problem.
P. POSTLEWArrE & M. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 114.
11 See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458,
495; see also supra note 10; Hooton, supra note 9, at 522-23; Levine, supra note 9, at 170; Maiers,
supra note 1, at 692; Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 8, at 1122.
The foreign earned income exclusion only functions as an incentive when the tax rate of
the foreign country is lower than the rate at which the individual would have been taxed had
he remained in the United States. Congress, however, has never taken the rate structures into
account, and has always viewed the provision as an incentive. Many commentators, on the
other hand, have advanced other rationales for the exclusion; see supra note 10; infia note 17
and accompanying text.
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that Congress has sought to benefit. This approach would be more ef-
fective in implementing the goals of the foreign earned income exclusion
than either the source or obligation approach.
I
SECTION 911: ORIGINS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Formative Years: 1926-1932
In 1926, the House Ways and Means Committee, "[i]n an endeavor
to take one further step toward increasing our foreign trade,"' 2 first pro-
posed an exclusion for foreign source income. As originally conceived,
the exclusion would have been available only to United States citizens
residing abroad who were engaged in selling tangible personal property
produced in, and exported from, the United States.13
The Senate Finance Committee at first questioned the need for
such a provision on the ground that expatriates who paid income tax to
a foreign country were entitled to the foreign tax credit.14 The confer-
ence committee report, however, reveals that the Senate declined to fol-
low the suggestion of the Finance Committee, and instead conceived of
an even broader exclusion than that originally contemplated by the
House.15 Although the House version was limited to salary and commis-
12 H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1926), reprlinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 315,
320.
13 [I]t is recommended ... that there shall be excluded from gross income in
the case of our citizens employed abroad in selling our merchandise amounts
received as salary or commission for the sale for export of tangible personal
property produced in the United States in respect of such sales made while
they are actually employed outside the United States, if they are so employed
for more than six months during a taxable year.
Id
14 S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1926), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
322, 348. The foreign tax credit then in existence as § 222 provided that
(a) The tax computed under Parts I and II of this title shall be credited with:
(1) In the case of a citizen of the United States the amount of any in-
come, war-profits and excess-profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable
year to any foreign country. ...
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 279.
The Code also provided in § 214 an alternative deduction for foreign taxes paid:
(a) In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year except...
(B) so much of the income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes, im-
posed by the authority of any foreign country. . . as is allowed as a
credit under section 222.
Id, ch. 234, 43 Stat. at 269-70.
15 The House bill provides that there shall be excluded from gross income in
cases of our citizens employed abroad in selling our merchandise amounts
received as salary or commission for the sale for export of tangible personal
property produced in the United States in respect of such sales made while
actually employed outside the United States, if so employed for more than six
months during the taxable year. The Senate amendment strikes out this pro-
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sions received from the sale of merchandise abroad, the Senate version
provided that a qualified individual would be able to exclude from gross
income amounts derived and received from any business conducted
without the United States. As finally enacted, the foreign earned in-
come exclusion embodied the Senate proposals.16
This first chapter in the history of section 911 suggests two impor-
tant points. First, Congress's primary purpose in enacting the exclusion
was to provide incentives for increased foreign trade. Second, Congress
did not consider the exclusion a redundant benefit despite the existence
of the foreign tax credit. These factors suggest that Congress's concern
went beyond saving Americans residing abroad from double taxation;
17
the exclusion would have been redundant had double taxation been
their sole concern.
The Senate Finance Committee proposed the repeal of the exclu-
sion in 1932.18 The Committee renewed its earlier criticism that the
exclusion was unnecessary, given the existence of the foreign tax
vision and substitutes one providing that there shall be excluded from gross
income in the case of an individual citizen of the United States, a bona fide
nonresident for more than six months during the taxable year, amounts de-
rived and received from business conducted without the United States. The
House recedes with an amendment which provides in the case of an individ-
ual citizen of the United States, a bona fide nonresident of the United States
for more than six months during the year, there shall be excluded from gross
income items of income received from sources without the United States
which are classified as "earned income" under section 209.
H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1926), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 361, 364.
16 Section 213(b)(14) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213(b)(14), 44 Stat. 9, 24-26,
provided:
(b) The term "gross income" does not include the following items, which
shall be exempt from taxation under this title:
(14) In the case of an individual citizen of the United States, a bona fide
nonresident of the United States for more than six months during the
taxable year, amounts received from sources without the United States if
such amounts constitute earned income as defined in section 209; but
such individual shall not be allowed as a deduction from his gross income
any deductions properly allocable to or chargeable against amounts ex-
cluded from gross income under this paragraph.
Section 209(a)(1) provided:
(1) The term "earned income" means wages, salaries, professional fees, and
other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually ren-
dered, but does not include that part of the compensation derived by the
taxpayer for personal services rendered by him to a corporation which repre-
sents a distribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance
as compensation for the personal services actually rendered.
Id ch. 27, § 209(a)(1), 44 Stat. at 20.
17 Some commentators have offered additional rationales. See supra notes 10-11.
18 Four years earlier Congress had redesignated the foreign earned income exclusion as
section 116(a), but otherwise left the section unchanged. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852,
§ 116(a), 45 Stat. 791, 823.
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credit. 19 The Committee also argued that the section exempted certain
individuals from all taxes.
20
Senator Reed disagreed with the proposed repeal of the exclusion.
He contended that the section served the interrelated functions of
"help[ing] our foreign trade and [placing] all Americans who are work-
ing abroad in a position of equality with their competitors. '2 1 This lat-
ter concern for equality referred to citizens from other countries working
abroad who were not taxed by their native countries. Senator Reed rec-
ognized, however, that the exclusion had led to some unintended results:
[T]he [exclusion] had been stretched to the point of exempting an
American naval officer or Army officer who was stationed. . . in [an]
embassy. . . or in some foreign country. . . .American ambassa-
dors and ministers and officers of the Foreign Service were getting
clear out of the payment of any income tax by virtue of the same
provision, which nobody in the world ever intended when the provi-
sion was first adopted. These people do not deserve the exemption,
because they are not subject to the income taxation of the foreign
countries in which they are stationed .... 22
As a way of "cur[ing] the wart [without] cutting off the whole leg,"
Senator Reed proposed a compromise amendment that would retain the
exclusion, but would exempt from its coverage compensation paid by
the United States or an agency thereof.23 The amendment would "tax
Americans who. . . are unfairly exempted now, like officers of our mili-
tary service and our Diplomatic Service."'24 Senator Reed withdrew his
amendment, however, in the face of substantial opposition, and the Sen-
ate voted to repeal the exclusion.
25
Although Senator Reed lost the battle in the Senate, his views ulti-
mately prevailed. In conference committee the House proposed an
amendment that restored the exclusion "except as to amounts paid by
the United States or any agency thereof. '26 Congress incorporated the
19 S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 496,
518.
20 [A] considerable proportion of the individuals previously benefited by this
subsection have been employees of the United States who, because of their
status as such, were usually exempt from any foreign tax upon their compen-
sation received from the United States; these citizens are not believed by your
committee to be entitled to a complete exemption from the Federal income
tax upon such compensation.
Id
21 75 CONG. REc. 10,410 (1932).
22 Id
23 Id
24 Id at 10,411.
25 Id at 10,412.
26 H.R. REP. No. 1492, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
539, 543.
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exception into section 116(a) by the Revenue Act of 1932.27
Although certain statements in the legislative history suggest that
Congress. was concerned solely with employees of the United States, the
language of the exception reveals a much broader concern. In amend-
ing section 116(a), Congress did not limit the exception to employees of
the United States. Congress instead meant to deny the benefits of the
exclusion to certain kinds of workers. The Senate Finance Committee
characterized them as "employees of the United States who, because of
their status as such, were usually exempt from any foreign tax upon their
compensation received from the United States."' 28 Not all United States
employees residing abroad are exempt from income tax by the country
of their residence. Only certain kinds of employees, such as "officers of
our military service and our Diplomatic Service" 29 receive this deferen-
tial treatment because of their special status.
This specific identification of a certain kind of worker, combined
with Congress's purpose to provide an incentive to foreign trade, sug-
gests that Congress meant to deny the exclusion to those individuals
who did not need any incentive to work abroad.30 For these individuals,
foreign service was an integral part of their work. When Congress first
conceived of this matter, these individuals tended to be employees of the
United States. There is nothing in the employer-employee relationship,
however, that suggests Congress meant to draw the line there. In identi-
fying these individuals as those who received amounts paid by the
United States or any agency thereof, Congress was unaware of the
problems it had created for courts attempting to define when an amount
comes within the exception to the foreign earned income exclusion.
27 As amended by the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 116(a), 47 Stat. 169, 204-05,
§ 116(a) provided:
In addition to the items specified in section 22(b), the following items
shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation
under this title:
(a) EARNED INCOME FROM SOURCES WITHOUT UNITED
STATES.-In the case of an individual citizen of the United States, a bona
fide nonresident of the United States for more than six months during the
taxable year, amounts received from sources without the United States (ex-
cept amounts paid by the United States or any agency thereof) if such
amounts constitute earned income; but such individual shall not be allowed
as a deduction from his gross income any deductions properly allocable to or
chargeable against amounts excluded from gross income under this
subsection.
28 S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1932), repointed in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 496,
518 (emphasis added).
29 75 CONG. REc. 10,411 (1932).
30 Although Congress's primary concern may appear to have been to prevent the com-
plete avoidance of taxation, Congress has never based qualification for the exclusion on the
payment ofsome foreign tax, despite its awareness of individuals who pay no tax by virtue of
the exclusion. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
19831
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B. Revision and Reaffirmation: 1932-1951
After surviving the Senate challenge, section 116(a) enjoyed a dec-
ade of neglect.31 In 1942, however, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee sought repeal of the exclusion. The Committee believed that
repeal would increase revenues and remedy perceived discrimination in
favor of individuals receiving compensation from nongovernmental
sources.3 2 The Senate Finance Committee reversed its earlier position
and defended the exclusion. The Committee recognized that taxpayers
had abused the section by leaving the country for six months and con-
tinuing to receive compensation from foreign sources for the sole pur-
pose of avoiding taxes, but believed that complete elimination of the
exclusion was unwarranted.33 The Senate Committee proposed to cure
the abuse by permitting the exclusion only for taxpayers who could es-
tablish bona fide foreign residency for the entire taxable year.34 The
Conference Committee adopted the Senate's proposal,3 5 and the Reve-
nue Act of 1942 retained the exclusion in section 116(a)(1), which
changed the residency requirement from six months to one year.36
31 The Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 166(a) 48 Stat. 680, 712, kept § 116(a) intact but
defined earned income by cross reference to § 25. This section retained the definition of
earned income, which had previously appeared in § 116(a), and added language regarding
the applicability of an earned income credit, which did not affect the applicability of the
exclusion. Slowinski & Williams, sup'a note 9, at 358.
Both the Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 116(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1689, and the Revenue
Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 116(a), 52 Stat. 447, 498, left § 116(a) unchanged. The Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 116(a), 53 Stat. 1, 48, codified § 116(a) as it appeared in the
Revenue Act of 1934.
32 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1942), repintedin 1942-2 C.B. 372, 412.
33 S. RE'. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1942), reprintedin 1942-2 C.B. 504, 548-49.
34 Id
35 H.R. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1942), reprintedin 1942-2 C.B. 701, 708.
36 The Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 148, 56 Stat. 798, 841-42, provided:
(a) EXCLUSION OF EARNED INCOME FROM FOREIGN
SOURCES.-Section 116 (a) (relating to earned income from sources with-
out the United States) is amended to read as follows:
"(a) EARNED INCOME FROM SOURCES WITHOUT THE
UNITED STATES.-
"(I) FOREIGN RESIDENT FOR ENTIRE TAXABLE YEAR.-
In the case of an individual citizen of the United States, who establishes
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is a bona fide resident of a
foreign country or countries during the entire taxable year, amounts re-
ceived from sources without the United States (except amounts paid by
the United States or any agency thereof) if such amounts would consti-
tute earned income as defined in section 25 (a) if received from sources
within the United States; but such individuals shall not be allowed as a
deduction from his gross income any deductions properly allocable to or
chargeable against amounts excluded from gross income under this
subsection.
Subsection (a) (2) was a new addition. It provided that a United States citizen who had
been a resident of a foreign country for at least two years before the date on which he be-
comes a United States resident could exclude amounts received from sources without the
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The Revenue Act of 1951. 7 changed section 116(a) in two ways.
First, in response to the growing sentiment in various sectors of Ameri-
can industry that section 116(a)(1) discriminated by denying a iaxpayer
the benefit of the exclusion in his first year abroad,38 Congress made the
exclusion applicable to an individual who was a "bona fide resident of a
foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period which includes
an entire taxable year."'3 9 Second, because the strict construction of the
bona fide residence abroad requirement had, in many cases, resulted in
the obstruction of one of the section's primary objectives, "encourag[ing]
citizens to go abroad," 4° Congress passed a new section 116(a)(2).41
Under this section, income earned abroad by a United States citizen
present in a foreign country or countries for at least seventeen out of
eighteen consecutive months is to be excluded from income.
42
United States (except amounts paid by the United States or any agency thereof) that were
attributable "to that part of such period of foreign residence before such date." Id at 842.
The Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 107(b), 58 Stat. 21, 32, left §§ 116(a)(1) and (a)(2)
intact and added a new subsection (a)(3) which defined earned income. This amendment did
not embody new tax policy, but merely incorporated the earned income definition in § 116,
rather than defining it by cross reference.
37 Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452.
38 Levine, supra note 9, at 171.
39 Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 321(a), 65 Stat. 452, 498.
40 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 495.
41 mhe term "bona fide" residence abroad has been construed quite
strictly. . . . Sometimes this has occurred because the nature of the individ-
ual's work is such as to make it difficult to establish a "residence" in the more
widely accepted use of the term. On other occasions it has resulted from the
fact that individuals have gone abroad only for a stated period of time. Ex-
amples of this are managers, technicians, and skilled workmen who are in-
duced to go abroad for periods of 18 to 36 months to complete specific
projects. Your committee believes. . . that it is particularly desirable to en-
courage men with technical knowledge to go abroad.
S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 495-96.
42 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 496.
Section 321(a) of the Revenue Act of 1951 provided:
(a) EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME.-Section 116 (a) (relat-
ing to earned income from sources without the United States) is hereby
amended by striking out paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting in lieu thereof
the following.
"(1) BONA FIDE RESIDENT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY-In
the case of an individual citizen of the United States, who establishes to
the satisfaction of the Secretary that he has been a bona fide resident of a
foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period which includes
an entire taxable year, amounts received from sources without the
United States (except amounts paid by the United States or any agency
thereof) if such amounts constitute earned income (as defined in para-
graph (3)) attributable to such period; but such individual shall not be
allowed as a deduction from his gross income any deductions properly
allocable to or chargeable against amounts excluded from gross income
under this paragraph.
"(2) PRESENCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY FOR 17
MONTHS.-In the case of an individual citizen of the United States,
who during any period of 18 consecutive months is present in a foreign
country or countries during at least 510 full days in such period, amounts
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C. Retrenchment: 1951-1976
The House Ways and Means Committee proposed the repeal of
section 116(a) (2) just two years after its enactment. The Committee be-
lieved that the section had already been subject to significant abuse.
First, the exclusion had induced some individuals with substantial in-
comes to go abroad to perform services typically performed at home in
order to avoid taxation.43 Second, many individuals to whom section
116(a)(2) applied paid no foreign income tax either because they were
not in the foreign country long enough to establish residence, or because
the foreign country imposed no income tax.
44
The Senate Finance Committee agreed that section 116(a)(2) had
been abused. The Senate Committee rejected outright repeal, however,
and proposed instead that an individual present in a foreign country for
seventeen out of eighteen consecutive months be limited to a $20,000
exclusion. 45 Congress enacted the Senate Finance Committee's proposal
into law in 1953.46 As in 1932, Congress was aware that the exclusion
enabled some individuals to avoid both foreign and domestic income
tax; significantly, it did not make the exclusion turn on the payment of
some foreign tax.
4 7
The exclusion remained unchanged for eight years after the codifi-
cation of sections 116(a)(1) and (2) as sections 911(a)(1) and (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.48 In 1962, Congress limited the amount
received from sources without the United States (except amounts paid by
the United States or any agency thereof) if such amounts constitute
earned income (as defined in paragraph (3)) attributable to such period;
but such individual
shall not be allowed as a deduction from his gross income any deductions
properly allocable to or chargeable against amounts excluded from gross in-
come under this paragraph."
Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 321(a), 65 Stat. 452, 498.
43 H.R. REP. No. 894, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1953), repnnted in 1953-2 C.B. 508, 511.
44 Id
45 S. REP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953), reptinted in 1953-2 C.B. 526, 529.
46 The Technical Changes Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-287, § 204, 67 Stat. 615, 618.
47 The Technical Changes Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-287, 67 Stat. 615, also provided
that if the 18 month period did not include the entire taxable year, the taxpayer must prorate
the amount of exclusion. Id
48 As enacted in 1954, § 911 provided:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The following items shall not be included in
gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle:
(1) BONA FIDE RESIDENT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY.-In
the case of an individual citizen of the United States, who establishes to
the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that he has been a bona
fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period
which includes an entire taxable year, amounts received from sources
without the United States (except amounts paid by the United States or
any agency thereof) if such amounts constitute earned income (as defined
in subsection (b)) attributable to such period; but such individual shall
not be allowed as a deduction from his gross income any deductions
(other than those allowed by section 151, relating to personal exemp-
[Vol. 68:592
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that could be excluded under section 911 (a) (1). Congress set a ceiling of
$20,000 a year for the first three years in which a taxpayer was a bona
fide resident of a foreign country, and $35,000 a year for each year
thereafter.4 9 Congress again reduced the amount of the exclusion two
years later. Although it retained the $20,000 ceiling for the first three
years abroad, Congress reduced the limit for later years from $35,000 to
$25,000.50 Section 911 then remained unchanged until 1976.
D. Recent Developments: 1976-1983
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 made major changes in the treatment
of foreign earned income. In the early stages of this legislation, the
House Ways and Means Committee recommended phasing out section
911 for two reasons that echoed the position of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee in 1932.5 t First, the exclusion enabled some citizens who paid no
tions) properly allocable to or chargeable against amounts excluded from
gross income under this paragraph.
(2) PRESENCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY FOR 17
MONTHS.-In the case of an individual citizen of the United States,
who during any period of 18 consecutive months is present in a foreign
country or countries during at least 510 full days in such period, amounts
received from sources without the United States (except amounts paid by
the United States or any agency thereo if such amounts constitute
earned income (as defined in subsection (b)) attributable to such period;
but such individual shall not be allowed as a deduction from his gross
income any deductions (other than those allowed by section 151, relating
to personal exemptions) properly allocable to or chargeable against
amounts excluded from gross income under this paragraph. If the 18-
month period includes the entire taxable year, the amount excluded
under this paragraph for such taxable year shall not exceed $20,000. If
the 18-month period does not include the entire taxable year, the
amount excluded under this paragraph for such taxable year shall not
exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to $20,000 as the number
of days in the part of the taxable year within the 18-month period bears
to the total number of days in such year.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3, 289.
The definition of earned income became § 911 (b). The change favored a taxpayer en-
gaged in a foreign trade or business in which both capital and personal services were income
producing. Slowinski & Williams, supra note 9, at 359-60.
The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 72, 72 Stat. 1606, 1660,
contained an amendment to § 6012 which provided that in determining whether an individ-
ual has to file a return, gross income shall be computed without regard to the § 911 exclusion.
Until this amendment, no return was required for an individual to exclude income under
§ 911. Hooton, supra note 9, at 173.
In 1961, the Kennedy administration recommended that individuals living in developed
countries be denied the exclusion. H.R. Doc. No. 140, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in
1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 1129, 1134. Atlhough Congress rejected the proposal,see
H.R. REP. No. 1447, 2d Sess. 54 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405, 458, the distinction
between taxpayers residing in developed and underdeveloped countries became central to
changes made in § 911 by the Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978. See infra notes 59-68 and
accompanying text.
49 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 11, 76 Stat. 960, 1004.
50 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 237, 78 Stat. 19, 128.
51 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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foreign income tax to avoid United States income tax.52 Second, those
who paid foreign income tax received a double benefit when the foreign
tax credit was coupled with the exclusion.53
The Senate Finance Committee recognized that section 911 had
brought about certain "unintended results," yet argued for retention of
the exclusion "so that the competitive position of U.S. firms abroad is
not jeopardized. '54 The Committee proposed two major changes.
First, it recommended that an individual qualifying for the exclu-
sion be denied the foreign tax credit with respect to foreign taxes alloca-
ble to amounts excluded from gross income.55 Second, it proposed
taking the amount of the exclusion "off the bottom" of gross income,
leaving the remaining portion to be taxed at the marginal rate that
would have applied without the exclusion.5 6 The Conference Commit-
tee adopted the Senate proposals, and in addition, reduced the amount
of the exclusion for most taxpayers from $20,000 to $15,000. 5 7 Several
52 H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1975), repn'ted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B.
695, 892.
53 Id
54 S. REP. No. 938, Part 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1976), repinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 3)
C.B. 49, 248.
55 Id at 211, repinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 3) C.B. at 249.
56 "[A]ny additional income derived by individuals beyond the income eligible for the
earned income exclusion is subject to U.S. tax at the higher rate brackets which would apply
if the excluded earned income were not so excluded." Id
Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act on October 4, 1976, and provided that § 911 and
related sections applied retroactively to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1011(d), 90 Stat. 1520, 1611. Following
enactment, Congress was beset with a tremendous outpouring of protest from United States
citizens employed overseas concerning the timing and substance of the 1976 changes. Maiers,
supra note 1, at 700. In response, Congress postponed the effective date of the changes to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1976. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 302, 91 Stat. 126, 152.
In 1977, the Treasury discovered through a study of 1975 tax returns filed by overseas
taxpayers that the Tax Reform Act changes were likely to have a greater impact than ex-
pected. Maiers, supra note 1, at 700-01. By the end of 1978, the effective date of the Tax
Reform Act changes was postponed a second time, to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1977. Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 3097
(1978).
The Tax Reform Act amendments never went into general effect, because the Foreign
Earned Income Act of 1978, see infra notes 60-68, replaced the exclusion with a deduction for
the excess costs of working abroad, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., lST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 41 (Comm. Print 1981). For any taxable year
beginning after December 31, 1977, taxpayers could elect to be taxed either under the 1976
provisions or under the 1978 Act. Tax Treatment and Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
615, § 209(c), 92 Stat. 3097, 3109 (1978).
57 H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 454 (1976). The exclusion remained at
$20,000 for employees of United States charitable organizations.
Congress also provided that an individual could make an irrevocable election not to have
the benefits of§ 911 apply. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1011(b), 90 Stat.
1520, 1611. Because foreign income taxes allocable to excluded foreign earned income were
no longer creditable against the American income tax, it generally would be advantageous for
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commentators believed that the Tax Reform Act changes fell only one
step short of outright repeal of the exclusion.58
The tremendous opposition by overseas employers and employees
to the Tax Reform Act led to a drastic modification of the 1976 amend-
ments5 9 in the Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978. 60 The House Ways
and Means Committee favored repeal of the Tax Reform Act changes,61
but proposed that the exclusion be available only to citizens not residing
in Canada or Western Europe. The Committee argued that the exclu-
sion was necessary
in order to compensate fully U.S. employees working abroad in areas
other than Canada and Western Europe for the hardships they must
endure and to encourage U.S. citizens to accept employment in those
areas. The presence of U.S. citizens working abroad encourages the
purchase of U.S., instead of foreign, goods and services, and, therefore,
the incentive provided by this bill will produce substantial benefits for
the U.S. economy.
62
The Committee also proposed deductions for excess foreign living costs
such as housing and schooling 63 for Americans residing in countries
other than Canada and those in Western Europe.
The Senate Finance Committee recognized that special considera-
tion should be given to United States citizens working abroad, but ar-
gued that relief based on a flat exclusion was arbitrary and unfair, and
that equitable relief would be more closely related to the actual in-
creased expenses of working abroad.64 In response to this problem, the
Senate proposed to replace the flat exclusion with deductions for the
increased cost of living abroad similar to those proposed by the House.
65
Under the Senate Finance Committee proposal, however, the deduc-
tions would also extend to Americans residing in Canada and Western
Europe.6
6
Congress ultimately adopted radical changes in the treatment of
an individual working in a country with a high tax rate to elect out of § 911. See, e.g., Hoo-
ton, supra note 9, at 528.
58 See Hooton, supra note 9, at 531; Levine, supra note 9, at 174; Maiers, supra note 1, at
697.
59 See Postlewaite & Stem, supra note 8, at 1101.
60 The Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978 was enacted as §§ 201-210 of the Tax Treat-
ment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978). For extensive discus-
sion of this act, see P. POSTLEWArrE & M. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 114-46; Maiers,supra note
1; Postlewaite & Stem, supra note 8; Note, Taxation of AmericanS Living Abrouti, supra note 8, at
79.
61 H.R. REP. No. 1463, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
62 Id
63 Id at 10-15.
64 S. REP. No. 746, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978-2 C.B. 422, 425.
65 Id at 8-11, reprinted in 1978-2 C.B. at 126-28.
66 Generally, those who previously had qualified for the foreign income exclusion were
eligible for the excess cost of living deductions. Id at 8 (1978), repinted in 1978-2 C.B. at 426.
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foreign earned income. The deductions proposed by the House and the
Senate were codified as section 913.67 A revised section 911 provided a
$20,000 exclusion to residents of "a camp located in a hardship area."
68
The Foreign Earned Income Act attempted to provide a better
"fit" between the expenses of working abroad and the tax benefits neces-
sary to offset those additional expenses. This represented a shift away
from the pure incentive aspect of section 911. The Act thus constituted
the most dramatic event in the treatment of foreign earned income since
the enactment of the exclusion in 1926. Its reign, however, was short
lived. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198169 changed the rules
once more, and restored the exclusion to its most favorable position
since 1962.
In consideration of this legislation, the House Ways and Means
Committee extensively reexamined the purposes of the exclusion.
70 It
concluded that accomplishment of those purposes required significant
modification in the treatment of foreign earned income. 7 1 Fifty years
67 Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 203, 92 Stat. 3097, 3100-
06.
68 The provisions for determining what constituted a "camp" and a "hardship area"
were set forth in §§ 911 (c)(1)(B) and 913(h)(2), respectively.
I.R.C. § 911(c) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1981) provided:
For purposes of this section, an individual shall not be considered to re-
side in a camp because of his employment unless the camp constitutes sub-
standard lodging which is-
(i) provided by or on behalf of the employer for the convenience of the
employer because the place at which such individual renders services is
in a remote area where satisfactory housing is not available on the open
market,
(ii) located, as near as practicable, in the vicinity of the place at which
such individual renders services, and
(iii) furnished in a common area (or enclave) which is not available to
the public and which normally accommodates 10 or more employees.
I.R.C. § 913(h)(2) (Supp. V 1981) provided:
For purposes of this section, the term 'hardship area' means any foreign
place designated by the Secretary of State as a hardship post where extraordi-
narily difficult living conditions, notably unhealthful conditions, or excessive
physical hardships exist and for which a post differential of 15 percent or
more-
(A) is provided under section 5925 of title 5, United States Code, or
(B) would be so provided if officers and employees of the Government of
the United States were present at that place.
69 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
70 H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352,
354.
71 The committee believes that it is necessary to change the tax law to encourage
Americans to work abroad to help promote the export of U.S. manufactured
goods and services. Reducing the tax burden on Americans working abroad
will make American enterprises more competitive in foreign markets. The
committee feels that a broad range of activities by Americans abroad benefit
[sic] the U.S. economy and should be encouraged.
The committee concludes that an appropriate incentive, to replace the
present excess foreing [sic] living cost deduction and exclusion, is to allow
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after the enactment of the foreign earned income exclusion, Congress
remained committed to the ideal of encouraging Americans to work
abroad. As finally enacted, the exclusion was limited to $75,000 for tax-
able years beginning in 1982, and increased each year in $5,000 incre-
ments, until reaching a maximum of $95,000 for taxable years
beginning with 1986.72
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 also made a change in
the language of the exception for amounts paid by the United States.
Since 1932, all versions of section 911 had contained an exception to the
exclusion for "amounts paid by the United States or any agency
thereof."73 The 1981 Act amended the provision to except amounts
"paid by the United States or an agency thereof to an employee of the
United States or an agency thereof."
74
E. Conclusion
Certain principles emerge from this legislative history. First, with
the exception of modifications made under the Foreign Earned Income
Act of 1978, the exclusion's primary purpose was to provide Americans
with an incentive to work abroad. Second, Congress was selective in
deciding who would benefit from the exclusion, and withheld that bene-
fit from individuals who needed no incentive to work abroad-the
group which it characterized as individuals who were paid by the
United States. Third, despite the availability of the foreign tax credit,
Congress has never viewed the exclusion as a redundant benefit, thus
underscoring the incentive aspect of section 911. Finally, although Con-
gress has frequently recognized that section 911 may permit individuals
to escape both foreign and domestic income tax, Congress has never
proposed that eligibility for the exclusion be dependent upon the pay-
ment of some tax. These general principles should guide courts attempt-
ing to define the limits of the foreign earned income exclusion, and to
determine when an amount has been paid by the United States or its
agency.
qualifying Americans to elect a substantial exclusion from U.S. tax for their
foreign earned income.
Id at 60, reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. at 354.
72 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 111 (a), 95 Stat. 172, 190.
73 See supra note 27.
74 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 111(a), 95 Stat. 172, 190.
Judge Forrester, dissenting in Smith v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1181, 1189 (1981), afd,
701 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1983), argued that the change helps to interpret the meaning of the
pre-1981 ERTA exception. Properly viewed, the change is irrelevant to the question consid-




JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE WHEN AN AMOUNT
HAS BEEN PAID BY THE UNITED STATES
Courts determining when an amount has been paid by the United
States within the meaning of the exception to the foreign earned income
exclusion follow two distinct approaches. Courts following the source
approach focus on the source of the funds from which the taxpayer has
been paid. Courts following the obligation approach rely on factors
such as which entity has the ultimate legal obligation to pay the tax-
payer and the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
A. The Source Approach
The source approach was first applied in Krichbaum v. United States. 75
The taxpayer in Kiichbaum was employed by the Bureau of Public
Roads of the Department of Commerce, and from 1951 to 1953, worked
for the Bureau on a road-building project in Ethiopia. To finance the
project, the government of Ethiopia borrowed several million dollars
from the International Bank. The Imperial Highway Authority of Ethi-
opia established a salary fund with some of the proceeds of this loan and
transferred portions of this fund to the United States government, which
paid Bureau employees working on the project.76
The taxpayer argued that his salary had been paid by the govern-
ment of Ethiopia, and thus was excludable from gross income under the
foreign earned income exclusion. The government contended that be-
cause the Bureau of Public Roads-an agency of the United States-
had paid the taxpayer's salary, the exception to the exclusion applied.
The court held that the taxpayer was eligible for the exclusion because
Ethiopia was the source of the payment.77
75 138 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
76 The American Embassy in Ethiopia issued Note No. 103, which contained the terms
of the agreement between the governments of Ethiopia and the United States:
The obligation to pay the salaries of the personnel so provided and as-
signed by the Bureau and of post differential, post allowances, quarters al-
lowances, and separation allowances ... shall be assumed by the Authority
[Ethiopia] subject to the manner and currency of payment hereinafter pro-
vided.
It is agreed that the Authority will authorize the Bank to provide within
the Bureau a working fund in an amount to be mutually determined by them
from which these and all other proper obligations for the account of the Au-
thority can be paid by the Bureau.
138 F. Supp. at 518.
77 The court noted that "[al]though a device was created by the Ethiopian government
whereby the Bureau of Public Roads of the American government handled the salary fund,
payment, nevertheless, was with Ethiopia's money." Id The court likened the Bureau of
Public Roads to the paymaster, and Ethiopia to the payor. Id at 525.
Although the court's analysis is grounded firmly in the source approach, it does at one
point use the language of obligation: "Payment in a legal sense relates to a debt or an obliga-
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Other courts have adopted the source approach. For example, in
Teskey v. Commissioner 78 the taxpayer was a seaman in the Merchant
Marine Service of the United States. The ship on which the taxpayer
served was owned by the United States, but was operated by a private
company as its agent. The ship was used in the shuttle service between
ports in Japan and Korea during the Korean War.
The Tax Court found that the United States provided the funds
from which the taxpayer had been paid.79 In deciding for the Service,
the court relied on a prior Revenue Ruling,80 which held that "wages
paid by a private shipping line as a general agent of the United States,
from funds provided for that purpose by the United States . . . are not excluda-
ble from gross income." '
The Ninth Circuit adopted the source approach in an opinion that
raises a number of questions concerning its interplay with the obligation
approach. In Erlandson v. Commissioner, 82 on facts identical to those in
Teskey, the Ninth Circuit held that the exception to the foreign earned
income exclusion applied because the United States was the source of
the funds from which the taxpayer had been paid.83 Although the court
expressly rejected the obligation approach,84 it stated in dictum that if
tion of the party who pays. Payment may be made by the debtor or by another in his behalf.
If it is paid by another, but with the debtor's money, it is payment by the debtor." Id The
district court did not use the word "obligation" in the same sense as later used by other
courts. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838
(1966); Smith v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1181, 1186 (1981),aft'd, 701 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Krichbawn court was concerned with a moral obligation that accrues to the party who has
benefited from some performance; more recently courts have used the term to indicate which
party has the ultimate legal responsibility to pay. Given the dichotomy that later developed,
the Kdchbaum court's choice of language was unfortunate; despite that language, however, the
court applied the source approach. But see Johnson v. United States, 6 FED. TAXES (P-H)
58,035 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating that Krichbaum is consistent with the obligation approach).
78 30 T.C. 456 (1958).
79 Id at 458.
80 Rev. Rul. 58-4, 1958-1 C.B. 268.
81 Id at 270 (emphasis added) (quoted in Tesk, 30 T.C. at 460-61 (emphasis added)).
The taxpayer in Teskey raised the issue of the employer-employee relationship, contend-
ing that because he was not a government employee, his salary was not paid by the United
States. 30 T.C. at 461. The court responded that whether or not the taxpayer was an em-
ployee of the government, "[t]he crucial question is, was the payment made by 'the United
States or any agency thereof.'" Id The court cited Suerdrup v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 859
(1950), which involved a partnership distribution, where the court held that an amount was
"paid by the United States" even though the taxpayer was not a government employee. In
Suerdrup, the court stated: "[i]t is significant that the words actually adopted in the amend-
ment were broad. Neither the word 'employees' nor the word 'compensation' was used. In-
stead, the amendment as passed reads: 'except amounts paid by the United States or any
agency thereof."' 14 T.C. at 866 (emphasis in original).
82 277 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1960), afg, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 58,218 (1958).
83 Id at 72.
84 [The Agent] was but a conduit for the payment of such wages by the United
States to the taxpayer. Speculation as to where [the taxpayer] could have
looked for relief if the payments had not been made is not helpful. The ques-
tion is who paid the wages, not who would be liable if they were not paid.
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the taxpayer had been an employee of the United States, "the conclu-
sion necessarily follows that his wages were paid by the United States or
an agency thereof";8 5 a statement that opposes, at least to some extent,
the court's disavowal of the obligation approach. The court held, how-
ever, that it was unnecessary for the Commissioner to demonstrate that
the taxpayer was a government employee, because the Service had suc-
cessfully shown that the taxpayer was paid by the United States.
86
The Erlandson court apparently believed that the existence of an
employer-employee relationship is fatal to the claim of the government
employee who asserts that he was not paid by the United States. The
absence of such a relationship, however, does not mean that the tax-
payer who was not such an employee will prevail; if the taxpayer is paid
by the United States, he is not entitled to the exclusion. The court
failed to explain why the existence of an employer-employee relation-
ship is fatal in the first case but not determinative in the second: If all
government employees are necessarily paid by their employer, why are
not all nongovernment employees necessarily paid by their employer?87
If there is something logically determinative about the employer-em-
ployee relationship in the first case, why is it not determinative in the
second as well?
Wolfe v. Commz'sioner88 presented substantially the same facts as
Kri'chbaurn. The taxpayer was an employee of the Bureau of Public
Roads working on a road construction project in Iran. To finance the
project, the Iranian government had borrowed from the Export-Import
Bank of Washington. The credit agreement conditioned the loan upon
arrangements satisfactory to the Bank under which the Bureau of Public
Roads would provide American engineers and technicians to do the
work. The credit agreement further specified that the Bureau and the
Iranian government should arrange to account for the "loan of Bureau
employees." Pursuant to this requirement, the Iranian government es-
tablished a "Dollar Working Fund" from which the Bureau employees
were paid.
89
Id at 73. But see Smith v. Commissioner, 701 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting obligation
approach); see also infia notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
85 Erlandson, 277 F.2d at 72.
86 Id
87 Advocates of both the source approach and the obligation approach have cited Er-
landson with approval without attempting to resolve this logical inconsistency. See Commis-
sioner v. Mooneyhan, 404 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1001 (1969);
United States v. Johnson, 386 F.2d 824, 825 (5th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1181, 1186 (1981), af'd, 701 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1983); Mooneyhan v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
693, 703 (1967); Wolfe v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 572, 578 (1965).
88 43 T.C. 572 (1965), rev'd, 361 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
89 43 T.C. at 575. The agreement between the Iranian government and the Bureau
provided:
Vol. 68:592
1983] FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION
The government argued that the appropriate interpretation of the
"paid by" exception focuses on the question of which party had the pri-
mary legal obligation to pay the debt.9° It also argued that the purpose
of the exclusion was to eliminate the possibility of double taxation, and
that because that possibility did not exist here, the exclusion should not
apply.9 ' In finding for the taxpayer, the Tax Court held that the obliga-
tion approach was not the appropriate test.
92
B. The Obligation Approach
The obligation approach focuses on the employer-employee rela-
tionship to determine which party has the ultimate legal obligation to
pay the taxpayer. The District of Columbia Circuit applied this ap-
proach in reversing the Tax Court's decision in Wolfe. 9 3 The court
stated that the exception to the foreign earned income exclusion applies
broadly to taxpayers who are employees of the United States govern-
V. COMPENSATION OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO IRAN
The compensation of all personnel of the Bureau assigned to Iran from
the date of assignment to the date of separation from the program will be
paid or reimbursed out of the Dollar Working Fund to be established by your
Government [Iran] as provided in Paragraph VII.
VII. DOLLAR WORKING FUND
To carry out the conditions of the $5,000,000 loan from the Export-Im-
port Bank signed on December 7, 1956 your Ministry [Iran] will establish a
Dollar Working Fund in the maximum amount of $500,000 with the Bureau
to be at the disposal of the Bureau for the payments as set out in this Agree-
ment.
The Dollar Working Fund shall be established in the amount of $200,000
and shall be replenished by your Government [Iran] from time to time upon
the request of the Bureau accompanied by an itemized statement signed by
an authorized representative of the Bureau setting forth all expenditures
made therefrom which have not been reported in any previous itemized state-
ment ...
[Each] replenishment of the Dollar Working Fund by your Government
shall be in an amount equal to the total of the expenditures set out in the
itemized statement accompanying the request for replenishment.
Id
90 Id at 577.
91 Id
92 The Tax Court equated the obligation approach with the existence of an employer-
employee relationship:
We are unable to agree with respondent's contention that the 'primary legal
obligation' test will lead to a correct solution of our problem. Whether peti-
tioner was an employee of the United States or of the Empire of Iran is im-
material. See Erlandson v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 70, 72, affirming a
Memorandum Opinion of this Court. Id at 578 (other citations omitted).
The Tax Court concluded that
[i]f [the amounts] were paid by the United States they would be includable in
petitioner's gross income. . . even though petitioner was not an employee of
the United States. Conversely it would follow that if they were not paid by
the United States or an agency thereof they would not be includable in peti-
tioner's gross income even though petitioner was an employee of the United
States.
Id
93 Commissioner v. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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ment. The court based its holding on three factors. First, the taxpayer
was an employee of the United States. 94 Second, "[t]he United States
had the primary and indeed sole obligation to pay taxpayer's salary,
and his rights were only against the United States. ' 95 Third, a United
States agency actually executed and delivered the salary checks to the
taxpayer.96 The court also pointed to the legislative history of the ex-
ception-specifically the 1932 report of the Senate Finance Committee
and the remarks of Senator Reed on the floor of the Senate9 7 -and con-
cluded that, as a government employee, the taxpayer came within the
class to which the exception applied.98
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also adopted the obligation ap-
proach. In United States v. Johnson, 99 on facts identical to those in Wofe,
the Fifth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit'0° and, pointing to the dictum from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Erlandson v. Commissioner, 101 stated that "when one is 'an employee of the
United States, the conclusion necessarily follows that his wages were
paid by the United States or an agency thereof.' "102
In Mooneyhan v. Commissioner, 103 the Tax Court was presented with
the same facts as in Wo/fe. The court found for the taxpayer, endorsing
its prior holding in Wolfe, and declining to follow the approach adopted
by the District of Columbia Circuit. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the Tax Court. 10 4 In joining the other courts of appeals which
had rejected the source approach, the Sixth Circuit pointed to the Er-
94 Id at 64.
95 Id at 65.
96 Id
97 See srupra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
98 361 F.2d at 67.
Judge Fahy argued in dissent that the statute looked to the source of the funds, not to the
employer-employee relationship. Id at 68. He also quarreled with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the legislative history of the exception:
When the exception "(except amounts paid by the United States or any
agency thereof)" was added by the 72d Congress the legislators were focusing
on those who were in the service of the United States and were abroad as a
regular and ordinary incident of that service, namely, military and diplomatic
personnel, not the volunteer who must be induced to go abroad.
Id at 69.
99 386 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1967).
100 Id at 825.
101 277 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1960).
102 386 F.2d at 825. The Fifth Circuit also noted the contradiction between this language
and the Tax Court's reliance on Erlandsqn to support the source approach. Id The district
court had found for the taxpayer on the authority of the Tax Court's decision in Wvo/. 66-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9575, at 86,857 (M.D. Ala. 1966). The district court, however, ren-
dered its decision before the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Wof.
103 47 T.C. 693 (1967), reo'd, 404 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1001
(1969).
104 Commissioner v. Mooneyhan, 404 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1001
(1969).
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landson dictum regarding the employer-employee relationship. 0 5
The Tax Court, which had previously followed the source ap-
proach, adopted the obligation approach in Smith v. Commissioner. 106
The taxpayer in Smith was employed by the United States Customs
Service at a customs preclearance station. Airlines frequently requested
the services of customs inspectors during their off-duty hours to process
passengers and baggage. The government required, before an airline's
request would be granted, that the airline deposit money or post a bond
to ensure payment for the services rendered.
10 7
The taxpayer claimed that because the airlines were the source of
his overtime compensation, the compensation was excludable from gross
income. In holding that the "paid by" exception applied, the Tax
Court stated that it would no longer follow the source approach exem-
plified by its earlier decisions in Wolfe and Moongyhan. 108 The court did
not explicitly adopt the conclusion of the courts of appeals regarding the
employer-employee relationship: "While it is true that the application
of section 911(a) does not necessarily turn on an employer/employee
relationship, it is also true that when there is such a relationship, one's
salary usually comes from one's employer and the existence of such a
relationship is a significant factor."' 0 9 Despite this language, ihe exist-
ence of such a relationship was, in fact, conclusive. The court noted that
"the U.S. Customs Service had the 'primary and sole obligation to pay'
105 The Sixth Circuit held that
whenever an employee of the United States receives his wages from his em-
ployer-whether this be "the Uited States . . . or an [sic] agency
thereof"--the exclusion and the exception to it are to be read together so that
the source of the funds becomes immaterial to the question of who paid them.
404 F.2d at 526. The Sixth Circuit, however, misread the Erlandon dictum regarding the
employer-employee relationship when it stated that "[t]he [Ninth Circuit] determined that
[the taxpayer] was an employee of the United States. . . ." Id. The Ninth Circuit never
reached the question of the taxpayer's employment in Erlandson See supra text accompanying
note 86.
Despite its rigid reliance on the employer-employee relationship, the Sixth Circuit is vir-
tually the only court to consider the position of the American worker in a foreign country and
attempt to relate Congress's purpose in enacting the exclusion to that position:
United States employees do not become while working overseas employ-
ees of foreign countries competing as such with other employees of those coun-
tries for identical wages; nor do they travel abroad with that purpose in mind.
To be entitled to the exclusion, there must be a direct relationship between
the individual claiming it and his foreign employer; the absence of such a
relationship defeats the claim. As we read its legislative history, the exception
to the exclusion logically denies to employees of the United States a tax bene-
fit that was enacted by Congress to help American citizens become foreign
employees.
404 F.2d at 526.
106 77 T.C. 1181 (1981).
107 This requirement is imposed by statute. See 19 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976).
108 77 T.C. at 1187.
109 Id at 1186 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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[the taxpayer]."" Moreover, the court stated that when it had looked
through a third-party payor to see the United States as the true source
of the funds, as it did in Teskq and in Erlandson, the third party had
been a disbursing agent of the United States."' The court, however,
never explained why the same reasoning did not apply in Smith; it is
easy to conceive of the airlines as the true source of the funds, and the
government as the disbursing agent of the airlines. The court presuma-
bly felt that this reasoning did not apply because of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
112
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax
Court."13 In so doing, the Er/andson dictum 114 became holding, 115 and
the court effectively adopted the obligation approach. 16
110 Id at 1186 n.5.
III Id at 1186.
112 The dissent in Smith argued for the application of the source approach. In contending
that the existence of an employer-employee relationship was irrelevant, the dissent pointed to
the change in the language of the exception made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 111(a), 95 Star. 172, 190 (1981). Although the new Act did not
apply in Smith, the dissent argued that the amendment helped to interpret the applicable
statute:
The fact that there is to be a dual requirement of "paid by" and "em-
ployed by" as the condition for denial of the earned income exclusion clearly
indicates that the current section 911 (a)(2) exception for amounts "paid by"
does not consider relevant the identity of one's employer as the United States.
77 T.C. at 1191 (Forrester, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Although the language of the
new exception suggests that one can be an employee of the United States without necessarily
being paid by the United States, the legislative history of the amendment to the exception
suggests that the change casts no light on the problem. As the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee explained:
The bill extends the benefits of the exclusion to individuals who are paid
by the United States but who are not eligible for any exclusion under section
912 or any other provision of U.S. law. As a general rul, therefore, employees
of the Federal government will not be eligible for the exclusion.
H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 62 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 355
(emphasis added). Section 912 provides that certain allowances received by civilian officers
and employees of the government are exempt from taxation. I.R.C. § 912 (Supp. V 1981).
The amendment, therefore, was probably intended to enable nonemployees of the govern-
ment who could not qualify under § 912 to exclude allowances under § 911, even though such
amounts were paid by the United States. However, in support of the dissent's position, it
should be noted that the House committee at least considered the possibility that government
employees could be eligible for the exclusion. See supra H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 62 (1981).
113 Smith v. Commissioner, 701 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1983).
114 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
115 The court rejected the argument that its prior holding in Erlandson v. Commissioner,
277 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1960), required a decision favorable to the taxpayer: "Although we
focused [in Erlandson] on the source of the funds, we said that if a taxpayer is a United States
employee, 'the conclusion necessarily follows that his wages were paid by the United States or
an agency thereof." Smith v. Comissioner, 701 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Erland-
son v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1960)).
116 The court placed ultimate reliance on the fact that the United States government,
rather than the individual customs inspector, bore the ultimate risk of nonpayment by the
airlines. Smith, 701 F.2d at 808. It is instructive to contrast this with the court's earlier state-
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III
A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE "PAID By" EXCEPTION:
A FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE WORKER
Courts attempting to determine when an amount has been paid by
the United States within the meaning of the exception to the foreign
earned income exclusion have followed two different approaches. The
Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have followed the obligation approach.
In Smith v. Commissioner, the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit both
adopted this approach. These courts have relied on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship in holding that United States employ-
ees are paid by the United States. The Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court
before Smith, as well as two district courts, have followed the source ap-
proach. These courts have considered the existence of an employer-em-
ployee relationship irrelevant, and have instead held that the source of
the funds from which the taxpayer has been paid is determinative. Both
of these approaches are flawed.
The obligation approach is logically inconsistent. Although it as-
sumes that all United States employees necessarily are paid by their em-
ployer, it does not accordingly assume that all nongovernment
employees are paid by their employer. The obligation approach is also
overly formalistic; it places undue emphasis on questions such as which
party executed and delivered salary checks, or which party has the ulti-
mate legal obligation under an employment contract. More fundamen-
tally, the obligation approach fails to properly address the congressional
purposes underlying the foreign earned income exclusion.
Although the source approach is neither logically inconsistent nor
formalistic, it too fails to adequately consider congressional goals.
Resolving the issue based on which party was the ultimate source of the
funds from which payment was made does not address issues of tax
policy.
An alternative approach is preferable. In determining when an
amount has been paid by the United States, and is thus excepted from
the exclusion, courts should attempt to implement congressional pur-
poses based on the legislative history of both the exclusion and the ex-
ception. This approach should entail a factual inquiry into the
circumstances of the individual worker. Using the principles deduced
from the legislative history as a guide, courts should determine to which
class the worker belongs: Is he a member of that class for which Con-
gress supplied an incentive to work abroad; or, conversely, is he a mem-
ment in Erlandsorn "Speculation as to where [the taxpayer] could have looked for relief if the
payments had not been made is not helpful. The question is who paid the wages, not who
would be liable if they were not paid." 277 F.2d at 73.
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ber of that class for which Congress thought no incentive to work
abroad was necessary? The former class is difficult to define with preci-
sion but consists at least of highly skilled workers and technicians, and
those involved in the export and sale of American-made goods. The
latter class is easier to define; it consists of individuals for whom foreign
service is a normal and expected incident of their career, such as those
in the diplomatic corps. This latter class also includes individuals for
whom the decision to work abroad is not truly voluntary, such as those
in the military.
This "classification approach" should involve an objective inquiry;
it should focus on the nature of the class, and should not allow the tax-
payer to introduce evidence of whether hepersonall needed an incentive
to work abroad. A subjective inquiry would prove unmanageable, rais-
ing questions of personal motive.
The classification analysis is preferable to either of the approaches
that the courts currently follow. It avoids the logical inconsistencies and
formalism of the obligation approach, and seeks to implement the con-
gressional intent that both the source and obligation approaches ignore.
The classification approach has one additional advantage: because the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is irrelevant, this ap-
proach focuses on the same factors regardless of whether or not the tax-
payer is an employee of the United States.
Application of the classification approach would alter the analysis
in some cases under section 911. For example, the merchant seamen in
Teskey and Erlandson are within that class of workers for whom no incen-
tive to work abroad is necessary. Extensive travel and time away from
home are the natural incidents of a sailor's life. On the other hand, the
road builders in Ki'chbaum, Wofe, Johnson, and Mooneyhan are the kinds
of workers Congress had in mind when it stated that "it is particularly
desirable to encourage men with technical knowledge to go abroad."11 7
The classification approach dictates that their salary would qualify for
the foreign earned income exclusion.
Smith is a more difficult case in which to apply the classification
approach. Although customs officers do not fall readily into either of
the two classes, it is clear that as a class, such an occupation contem-
plates the possibility of foreign service. The customs officer thus should
be placed in that category for which no incentive to work abroad is
necessary. The classification approach, therefore, would be likely to
lead to the same result reached by the Tax Court in Smith. Even if
courts disagreed on the proper result given such facts, the classification
approach would at least focus their inquiry, and would be more likely to
lead to a result consonant with congressional intent.
117 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951), repinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 496.
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CONCLUSION
Courts attempting to determine when an amount has been paid by
the United States within the meaning of the exception to the foreign
earned income exclusion follow two different approaches. Some courts
follow the source approach and identify the source of the funds from
which the taxpayer has been paid. Other courts follow the obligation
approach and rely primarily on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship in identifying who has the ultimate legal obligation to the
taxpayer. Both approaches are misguided because they turn on abstract
distinctions not rooted in the congressional purpose underlying section
911. The classification approach suggested in this Note better imple-
ments congressional purpose by inquiring into the factual circumstances
of the particular worker and determining whether he is a member of
that class which Congress sought to benefit by the exclusion.
Glenn Kurlander

